Indirect Prompt Injection deep reading
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Indirect Prompt Injection: Web Pages and Tool Returns Become Instruction Channels, but 2023 Cases Do Not Represent Later Guard Products
Intermediate Agent runtime, safety, and evaluationA source-grounded reading of Greshake et al., arXiv:2302.12173 v2: when LLM-integrated apps retrieve web pages, email, or tool output, untrusted data enters the prompt as if it were instructions. The authors demonstrate indirect prompt injection on Bing Chat, GitHub Copilot, and synthetic GPT-4 apps and give a computer-security threat taxonomy. This is 2023 control-plane evidence, not a Llama-Guard, Constitutional AI, OWASP Top-10, or jailbreak-benchmark product SLA.
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